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APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1994): 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action . . . and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as 
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court 
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. 
REBUTTAL FACTS 
1. As an illustration of Ms. Dennison7s disregard for 
the actual facts herein and contrary to her assertion on pg. 2 of 
her brief, Ms. Dennison knew why the payments from Mr. Hammond 
had ceased at least one month before she filed her motion on 
March 26, 1993. (R. 628-629). 
2. The essence of the transaction pursuant to which 
Mr. Hammond loaned $25,000.00 to Mr. Orr was so that Mr. Orr 
could exercise an option on land for which he had a buyer. The 
shares of stock were only additional incentive to Mr. Hammond. 
(R. 723-724). 
3. There is no evidence in the record to support Ms. 
Dennison's allegation in her brief that it was never agreed, 
discussed or implied that Mr. Hammond would have the right to 
encumber the HHEICO contract. Her references in paragraph 6 of 
her statement of facts do not provide any such support. 
4. Contrary to the statements in paragraph 7 of the 
statement of facts, Mr. Hammond's testimony was that Ms. Dennison 
did not have an interest in the HHEICO contract. (R. 736) . 
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5. The amount of $262,951.41 referred to in paragraph 
11 of the statement of facts is misleading as it is a gross 
balance which includes amounts owing on other senior obligations 
which had to be paid before arriving at the net proceeds. (R. 
636-637 and 649-650). 
6. Additionally, in said paragraph the Decree of 
Divorce is mischaracterized. The decree only awarded to Ms. 
Dennison 65% of the net proceeds. (R. 271-272). 
7. Paragraph 12 of the statement of facts 
mischaracterizes the document at pg. 383 of the record. The 
document thereat states that $51,509.37 is the present value of 
218 months of payments in the amount of $505.05. (R. 383). 
8. Paragraph 14 of the statement of facts is an 
assertion of Ms. Dennison's counsel and not a statement contained 
anywhere in the record. 
9. The amount of $110,100.90 as an amount Ms. Dennison 
lost relies upon a statement by the trial court which is contrary 
to the evidence. It assumes, with no factual basis, that there 
would be 218 future payments of $505.05. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Post judgment civil contempt orders are appealable 
as a matter of right. Furthermore, orders which have been 
certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are appealable as a matter of right. 
II. Ms. Dennison relies solely upon paragraph 7, 
however, paragraph 7 does not in any manner forbid Mr. Hammond 
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from selling, transferring or otherwise encumbering the HHEICO 
contract and it does not command Mr. Hammond to obtain the 
consent of Ms. Dennison before dealing with the HHEICO contract. 
Mr. Hammond testified that his understanding was that he always 
has had the right to sell or transfer said contract and that Ms. 
Dennison never has had any interest in the HHEICO contract at any 
time. 
Ms. Dennison has not presented any evidence to 
contradict Mr. Hammond's showing of a lack of ability to comply 
with any court order. 
Findings of Fact No. 10 and No. 11 do not provide any 
support for the trial court's ruling. 
III. There is insufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's order as an award of damages. Said order is a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce which exceeds the power of 
the trial court in the proceeding before the court. 
IV. Critical evidence regarding the value of the 
HHEICO contract was missing at the time of Mr. Hammond's motion 
to dismiss. Ms. Dennison fails to provide any reference to any 
such evidence and, accordingly, Mr. Hammond's motion to dismiss 
should have been granted. 
V. No evidence of reasonableness was presented at the 
second hearing for which attorney's fees were awarded. The fee 
arrangement at the second hearing was an hourly arrangement 
rather than the flat fee arrangement which existed at the time of 
the first hearing. Accordingly, there is no evidence to support 
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the trial court's conclusion of law regarding reasonableness of 
the amount of fees for the services provided after the first 
hearing. Since Mr. Hammond is not in contempt, Ms. Dennison 
should not have been awarded any attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ENTERED ON DECEMBER 
13, 1994 IS APPEALABLE. 
Appellee, Ms. Dennison, relies upon Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) for its sole authority that the 
order entered on December 13, 1994 is not appealable. However, 
Ms. Dennison does not in any manner address the position of the 
Utah Supreme Court stated therein as follows: 
On occasion, we have treated an order of civil contempt 
as final and appealable. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. 
Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981); Thomas v. Thomas, 
569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977); Snow v. Snow, 13 Utah 15, 43 
P. 620 (1896). In Bradshaw, Thomas, and Snow, the 
contempt orders arose out of supplemental proceedings 
after a final judgment; therefore, it was unlikely that 
any subsequent judgment would be entered from which an 
appeal could be taken. 
Id. at 1167 n. 3. All of the quotes in Ms. Dennison's brief 
refer to prejudgment civil contempt orders. In the instant case 
the ruling of the trial court entered on December 13, 1994 arose 
out of Ms. Dennison's post judgment Order to Show Cause. No 
subsequent judgment will be entered except as to other issues as 
raised pursuant to the trial court's continuing jurisdiction of a 
domestic matter. 
In Thomas the appeal was from a civil contempt order 
entered in a domestic matter pursuant to a post judgment order to 
show cause. The instant case is the same procedural setting. 
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Accordingly, as in Bradshaw, Thomas and Snow, the ruling of the 
trial court is appealable as a matter of right. 
Additionally, in Von Hake the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that "an order finding one guilty of criminal contempt is 
generally considered to be a final order separate from any 
ongoing proceedings and appealable as a matter of right". Von 
Hake, 759 P.2d at 1167. On the other hand an order regarding 
civil contempt during prejudgment civil proceedings is treated 
the same as any other order entered during the course of civil 
proceedings. Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(1994) provides the procedure to appeal said orders as a matter 
of right and states as follows: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action . . . and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as 
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court 
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. 
In the instant case such an express determination was 
made by the trial court that there was no just reason for delay 
and an express direction that the order entered on December 13, 
1994 was a final appealable order. (R. 615-616). Ms. Dennison 
neglected to inform the Court of this proceeding or to address 
the effect of said proceeding. On the basis of this proceeding 
alone, the order entered on December 13, 1994 is appealable as a 
matter of right. 
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II. MR. HAMMOND IS NOT IN CONTEMPT OF ANY COURT ORDER. 
A. The Decree of Divorce does not impose a duty by its language 
to not sell, transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract. 
U.C.A. §30-3-5(1) and Estate of Manfield, 856 P.2d 1056 
(Utah 1993) are irrelevant to the issues before the Court. There 
is no issue herein regarding the court's power to divide the 
marital estate upon divorce. 
Ms. Dennison's assertions that she became the owner of 
65% of the proceeds of the HHEICO contract and that she held a 
majority interest in the HHEICO contract are wrong and there was 
no evidence of the value of an award of 65% of the net proceeds. 
(Brief of Appellee at 12). The trial court acknowledged that Ms. 
Dennison was not an owner of the HHEICO contract when it 
prevented her from testifying as to its value based upon an 
objection that she had no ownership interest therein. (R. 694-
695) . Ms. Dennison was awarded "65% of the net proceeds of the 
HHEICO contract". (R. 271). The net proceeds can only be the 
amount of money which Mr. Hammond had left, of that which he had 
received pursuant to the HHEICO contract, after he paid certain 
obligations. Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce created a debt 
from Mr. Hammond to Ms. Dennison. 
Ms. Dennison has not referred the Court to any 
provision or language of the Decree of Divorce or any other order 
which requires that Mr. Hammond obtain Ms. Dennison's consent 
prior to selling, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the 
HHEICO contract. No such language exists. Ms. Dennison has not 
referred the Court to any provision or language of the Decree of 
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Divorce or any other order which forbids Mr. Hammond from 
selling, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the HHEICO 
contract. None exists. 
The only provision of a court order which Ms. Dennison 
relies upon is paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce. Paragraph 7 
states as follows: 
The plaintiff is awarded sixty-five percent (65%) of 
the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the 
defendant is awarded thirty-five percent (35%) of the 
net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net 
proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $777.00 per.(sic) 
The plaintiff is entitled to receive $505.05 per month 
and the defendant is entitled to receive $271.95 per 
month from the HHEICO contract. In the event that the 
net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall 
differ from the $777.00 per month, then the parties 
shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent (65%) 
to the plaintiff and thirty-five percent (35%) to the 
defendant. 
There is no language therein forbidding Mr. Hammond to sell, 
encumber or otherwise deal with the HHEICO contract, no language 
awarding an ownership interest to Ms. Dennison and no requirement 
to obtain her consent. Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce 
specifically contemplates the situation wherein the net amount 
received from the HHEICO contract is other than $777.00 per 
month, such as the sale or other transfer, and provides that Ms. 
Dennison shall receive 65% of the net amount received. 
Restrictions could easily have been placed upon Mr. 
Hammond if it had been so intended. Said restrictions must be 
there explicitly in order to create a known duty, which did not 
previously exist, to not sell, transfer, assign or encumber said 
contract. 
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If there is no command, there is no disobedience. A 
person may not be held in contempt of court for 
violating an order, unless the terms of the order are 
definite, certain and specific. 
Goodover v. Lindey's Inc., 847 P.2d 699, 701 (Mont. 1993). 
Furthermore, Ms. Dennison does not refer this Court to 
any evidence at all that Mr. Hammond understood that he was 
restricted from selling, transferring or encumbering the 
contract. The only evidence referred to by Ms. Dennison is that 
Mr. Hammond had knowledge of paragraph 7 of the Decree of 
Divorce. (Brief of Appellee at 15). There is no evidence or 
support for Ms. Dennison's allegation in her brief that it was 
never agreed, discussed or implied that Mr. Hammond would have 
the right to encumber the HHEICO contract. 
Mr. Hammond testified that his understanding was that 
he always has had the right to sell or transfer said contract. 
He testified that it was his understanding that Ms. Dennison did 
not have any interest in the HHEICO contract at any time. (R. 
693, 736, 745-746 and 755-756). There is no controverting 
testimony. 
B. Mr. Hammond did not have the ability to comply with the court 
order and did not willfully and knowingly refuse to comply with 
the order. 
The only evidence that Ms. Dennison sets forth to show 
that she met her burden of proving, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that Mr. Hammond had the ability to comply with the 
court order is some testimony by Mr. Hammond wherein he 
acknowledges that he could rent an apartment at a cost of $650.00 
per month. Ms. Dennison tries to imply that Mr. Hammond could 
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have used his portion of the HHEICO proceeds and other money then 
being spent on a house payment to find other housing and, thus, 
he had the ability to pay Ms. Dennison. Said implication fails 
because Ms. Dennison failed to show that the money Mr. Hammond 
was receiving from the HHEICO contract was not the same money 
being used to pay his portion of the house payment. No other 
evidence is presented by Ms. Dennison to support her burden or to 
rebut the testimony of Mr. Hammond regarding his financial 
condition and that he did not have the ability to pay Ms. 
Dennison her portion of the proceeds. 
Ms. Dennison relies upon Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 
1119 (Utah 1977) to claim that by she has met her burden by 
showing that there is a judgment and failure to comply with said 
judgment. However, Ms. Dennison fails to address the 
requirements stated immediately following the language which she 
quotes to the Court which is as follows: 
But where there is evidence concerning justification 
for the failure, the ultimate burden of proving that 
the party charged is in contempt is on the complainant. 
. . . 
Under what we regard as a view more enlightened 
than prevailed in former times, the mere failure to pay 
a debt or meet an obligation is not punishable by 
imprisonment. 
Id. at 1121. In the instant case evidence was presented 
concerning justification for the acts of Mr. Hammond which 
included evidence of unemployment, his financial condition and 
that he was providing the sole support for the minor children. 
(R. 646, 648, 653-654, 690-691, 720-721 and 729). Accordingly, 
the burden remains upon Ms. Dennison to show all three elements 
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of contempt as set forth in Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n v. 
Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988) and to meet the burden she must 
show more than there is a judgment and a failure to comply with 
said judgment. 
C. The findings of the trial court are inadequate to support a 
holding of contempt. 
Ms. Dennison alleges that, in addition to Findings of 
Fact No. 9 and No. 13, which were discussed in the Brief of 
Appellant at 18-19, Findings of Fact No. 10 and 11 provide 
sufficient basis for the trial court's finding of contempt. 
(Brief of Appellee at 19). Finding of Fact No. 10 in essence 
states that Mr. Hammond did not confer with Ms. Dennison or 
obtain her consent. Finding of Fact No. 10 does not provide any 
support for a conclusion that Mr. Hammond knew of the duty 
imposed by the court's order, that he had the ability to comply 
with the order, or that he willfully and knowingly refused to 
comply. 
Finding of Fact No. 11 is an ultimate conclusion of the 
trial court interpreting paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce. 
It lacks supporting facts, is erroneous on its face, cannot be 
supported by any evidence and is proven incorrect by the trial 
court's own statements. 
Finding of Fact No. 11 states: "There did not need to 
be a specific provision in the decree to make clear that he was 
prevented from encumbering the HHEICO contract." As explained 
above, that is clear error and contrary to law. Furthermore, it 
is an admission by the trial court that there is no command in 
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the Decree of Divorce forbidding Mr. Hammond to sell or otherwise 
transfer the HHEICO contract. 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, on several 
occasions during the proceedings before the trial court the trial 
court stated that the Decree of Divorce did not restrict Mr. 
Hammond from selling or transferring the HHEICO contract. The 
fact that the judge, after reading the Decree of Divorce, so 
stated is clear, convincing proof that paragraph 7 of the Decree 
of Divorce does not prevent Mr. Hammond from encumbering the 
HHEICO contract. 
Finally, Ms. Dennison has not presented any evidence 
regarding the meaning of paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce, 
other than paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce. As explained 
above, Mr. Hammond testified that he did not understand paragraph 
7 of the Decree of Divorce to in any way restrict his ability to 
sell, transfer or encumber the HHEICO contract. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS POWER IN ORDERING 
MR. HAMMOND TO REPAY MS. DENNISON AND TO SERVE 30 DAYS 
IN JAIL. 
This appeal is the proper time and manner to contest 
the trial court's order after the evidentiary hearing. Mr. 
Hammond is not required to go through any post judgment 
proceedings before he can appeal the order. 
The only evidence that Ms. Dennison relies upon to 
justify the court's ruling as an award of damages is the monthly 
amount set forth in the Decree of Divorce of $505.05 and an 
amortization schedule showing that, if all payments are made in 
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the future at the amount specified in the Decree of Divorce, 218 
payments would be made. This totally ignores paragraph 7 of the 
Decree of Divorce which must be followed in determining what Ms. 
Dennison is entitled to recover. It also ignores the testimony 
of Mr. Poulson, the holder of the HHEICO contract, that he didn't 
know if the payments would continue in the future and that the 
obligor on the contract had recently changed. (R. 764-765). 
There is insufficient evidence for the trial court's 
award if it is for damages. In essence the trial court's order 
is a modification of the Decree of Divorce it should be vacated 
because it exceeds the power of the trial court in the 
proceedings before the court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING MR. 
HAMMOND'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Ms. Dennison incorrectly characterizes the testimony in 
the trial court and provides no support for her allegations. 
(Brief of Appellee at 22). Mr. Hammond testified that he sold 
the HHEICO contract in order to borrow $25,000 in an attempt to 
not be required to sell the home where he resided with the 
parties' minor child. (R. 744). No evidence of present value 
was presented to the trial court at the time of the Mr. Hammond's 
motion to dismiss. Furthermore, evidence of present value is not 
sufficient to establish the fair market value of the contract. 
No evidence regarding the factors that a willing buyer considers 
when purchasing such a contract or opinion as to its value was 
presented. 
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The other testimony relied upon by Ms. Dennison in her 
brief - the gross balance of the contract and the number of 
remaining payments - is insufficient to establish the value of 
the HHEICO contract. If the value is not established it is not 
possible to determine whether it has been improperly discounted. 
Accordingly, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom 
do not establish that Ms. Dennison convincingly showed a right to 
relief. Critical evidence was missing and Mr. Hammond's motion 
to dismiss should have been granted. 
V. MRS. DENNISON IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Ms. Dennison inaccurately states that evidence was 
proffered regarding the reasonableness of the fees awarded to Ms. 
Dennison. Some evidence of reasonableness was presented at the 
first hearing. (R. 672). No evidence of reasonableness was 
presented at the second hearing for which attorney's fees were 
awarded. (R. 708-709). The fee arrangement at the second 
hearing was an hourly arrangement rather than the flat fee 
arrangement which existed at the time of the first hearing. 
Accordingly, there is no evidence to support the trial court's 
conclusion of law regarding reasonableness of the amount of fees 
for the services provided after the first hearing. Ms. Dennison 
has the burden of proving the reasonableness of said fees. Since 
there is no evidence in this regard the award should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case there was no evidence of a known 
duty imposed by the court's order; the ability to comply with the 
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order; and willfully and knowingly refusing to comply with said 
order. The simple existence of the trial court's ruling on 
August 11, 1993 demonstrates that the Decree of Divorce does not 
impose a known duty by its language to not sell, transfer or 
encumber the HHEICO contract. Finally, the findings of the trial 
court are inadequate to support its holding of contempt. 
It was improper for the trial court to modify the 
Decree of Divorce and it exceed its power in ordering Mr. Hammond 
to make payments to Mrs. Dennison and in ordering a judgment in 
the event of default. Since Mr. Hammond is not in contempt and 
Mrs. Dennison did not prevail on her order to show cause, she 
should not have been awarded any attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of February, 1996. 
DAVID J. HODGSON 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of the 
foregoing to James B. Hanks, Judge Building, Suite 740, Salt Lake 
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